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Abstract 
The economic crisis has exposed shortcomings in standard economic theory and provided 
an impetus for new economic thinking. But the theoretical debate in the wake of the crisis 
has been unduly constrained by the terms of the mainstream approach to economic 
theory. Like any approach, it is characterised by a way of framing reality, giving meaning 
to terms and setting criteria for good argument. It also determines how any economic 
theory is understood, whether from the history of economic thought or from the 
contemporary literature. But there are other approaches to economics which would open 
up the field to a much wider range of possibilities for new economic thinking. Addressing 
the challenge that any reader bases her understanding on her own approach, the purpose 
of this paper is to attempt to explain what it means to consider different approaches and 
why it matters for policy. This is done by discussing two features of the financial crisis 
which pose particular problems for economic theory. These are the role of changing 
market sentiment in driving asset prices on the one hand and the breakdown of trust 
relationships in banking on the other (the moral hazard issue). We will see how these are 
addressed by mainstream theory and by alternative approaches. First, market sentiment is 
discussed within the mainstream rational-optimising framework, where risk is 
quantifiable, and compared with the Keynesian approach based on the general uncertainty 
of knowledge, where reason, evidence and sentiment are integrated. The moral hazard 
issue is then discussed in its mainstream form in terms of rational opportunism and in its 
institutionalist form in terms of the foundation of social relations (including relations 
between institutions) in trust. It is shown that different ways of approaching theorising in 
each case imply different policy measures. It is argued further that an exclusively 
deductive mathematical approach to analysis of market sentiment and trust is unduly 
limiting and that a more pluralist approach would more fully address the issues.  
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 1 
Introduction 
The financial crisis which began in 2007 has sparked an unusual degree of reflection on 
the state of economics. For many economists, it was challenging to explain the crisis. 
Mainstream theory had been founded on the presumption of underlying stabilising 
tendencies in competitive markets. But the authorities were required to act without 
waiting until the dust had settled in academic economics. In the process reference was 
made to theories outside the mainstream which addressed problems arising from markets 
not equilibrating at the full employment level and to figures from the history of economic 
thought. Thus Keynes was invoked in support of expansionary fiscal policy, while 
Minsky’s theory of financial instability was invoked in support of the supply of liquidity 
to the financial system. Reference was also made to other older literatures for alternative 
explanations of the crisis, notably the Hayekian literature which focused on interest rates 
having been held below the natural rate.  
 Now a range of explanations for the crisis has been developed within the 
mainstream which retains the foundation of a presumption of equilibrating competitive 
markets. These explanations refer to factors which inhibited this equilibrating process, 
particularly information asymmetries, irrational behaviour and state interference in the 
form of the lender-of-last-resort facility. The policy solutions follow directly in the form 
of removing these factors to prevent a recurrence of crisis – that is, making reality more 
like the standard model. The policy of fiscal expansion has generally been reversed, the 
focus returning to the supply side, while concerns are raised about expected inflationary 
effects of quantitative easing. 
 Much of the public debate about reform, as expressed for example in the pages of 
the Financial Times, has taken a wider purview and indeed at times has actively 
questioned the conventional mainstream approach to economics. Yet there has been little 
coverage of what would actually be entailed by opening up the question of other ways of 
approaching economics. The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the possibility 
of re-examining not just theory but also theoretical approach as a way of addressing 
policy in the light of the crisis and to consider how that might impact on policy advice. 
To consider the question at this level of approach is justified by the challenges posed by 
the crisis, but is justified further by the fact that theory within some non-mainstream 
approaches had anticipated the crisis and were able to explain it as it evolved. Some 
wider reflection on economics is called for.3  
 The mainstream approach is characterised by an insistence that arguments be 
expressed (or capable of expression) in terms of formal deductivist mathematical logic. 
But this is not the only possibility; there is a range of alternatives, some of which employ 
some form of formal mathematical expression to some degree. But the critical difference 
is that mathematical formulation does not fully define these approaches. It is not a matter 
of abstraction or not: any theory and any theoretical approach inevitably require 
abstraction. Theory abstracts from variables thought to be less important to the question 
at hand. Theoretical approach goes much further. It employs particular ways of 
understanding, and therefore categorising, the subject matter, giving particular meanings 
to terms (such as ‘rationality’), and specifying the range of acceptable forms of argument. 
Thus any approach is based on a process of framing the subject matter, where framing 
involves ‘selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration’ (Weaver, 2007, p. 143). Not 
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only does this abstraction provide the terms within which theory currently develops, but it 
also provides the terms in which older ideas are understood. There is no sense in which 
any approach can replicate reality; each approach to knowledge is an abstraction from 
reality and therefore incomplete in a variety of ways. Yet, as we shall see, different 
approaches involve a different approach to abstraction itself, and therefore a different 
relation with reality.  
 For any economist, deciding on one approach or another is necessary for 
knowledge to be developed, to inform policy. The choice to adopt one approach involves 
putting higher value on what that approach allows relative to what it precludes. But, 
while reasoned justifications can be made, there is no absolute basis for choosing one 
approach over another. Choice for economists, as for economic agents (on which more 
below), requires the exercise of judgement.4 Study of the history of economics provides 
basic material for developing the capacity for judgement, showing how different ideas 
have developed in different contexts in order to address particular problems. But it also 
provides material on different approaches to economics. Without understanding what is 
involved in difference of approach, ideas from the history of economics can become 
distorted by modern frameworks. Thus, for example, only Keynes’s fiscal stimulus 
policy, Minsky’s idea of systemic risk through interconnectedness of portfolios and 
Hayek’s idea about interest rates have been picked up following the crisis, out of their 
much broader theories. But the different approaches within which these particular ideas 
were embedded have been ignored since they do not make any sense within a mainstream 
framework (because they are not compatible with the mainstream deductivist 
methodology). 
 There is an inevitably reflexive element in analysing the framing of the crisis in 
this paper, since, as an analyst, I have my own framing. This framing inevitably pitches 
the argument in favour of the alternative approaches which I will explore below as better 
addressing the problems posed by the crisis than the mainstream approach. It is important 
therefore to reiterate that all approaches have their limitations since they each abstract in 
some way or another. Nor do I want to suggest that these alternative approaches are 
complete in their own terms. Indeed according to these approaches, theory is provisional 
in the face of an evolving subject matter. While enumerating some of these limitations 
would require further exploration from other perspectives, the aim here is the more 
limited one of illustrating what is entailed in taking different approaches, albeit from one 
meta-methodological approach.  
 While it could be argued that any analysis should start with reality (framed in 
some way) if it is to be useful for policy-makers, this itself involves some circularity. 
First, this in itself involves an approach which relies more on induction than the more 
deductivist methodology of mainstream economics. By this is meant, not pure induction, 
since understanding of evidence is conditioned by theory, but that theory is grounded in 
evidence and is regarded as provisional in the face of future evidence, or evidence from 
different contexts. Further, reality will be understood differently by different groupings of 
economists (as well as policy-makers, and indeed political parties). Nevertheless it seems 
the best place to start, even if (as with Debreu 1991) the conclusion is that reality is best 
addressed by abstract theory for universal application. The motivation is to open up the 
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discussion beyond the mainstream approach, which involves starting with a particular 
theoretical framework, seeing how to adapt it to current circumstances and ultimately 
considering policy to make behaviour and market structure more consistent with the 
framework. The issue of different ways of understanding reality (different ontologies) 
will be addressed in the course of the analysis below. 
 Broadening the discussion to encompass different approaches could be 
understood in terms of widening the choice from which some new standard theory and 
theoretical approach are selected. But that in itself would reflect a particular approach. 
Methodological pluralism is a different approach which argues for actively fostering 
diversity of approach on the grounds that, as in biology, the capacity to adapt in the face 
of further environmental threats is enhanced. This is often misunderstood as ‘anything 
goes’. But to consider pluralism in this way is to continue in the dualistic (either/or) 
approach of mainstream economics: there is only one best approach (Dow 1990). 
Pluralism in its own non-dualistic terms rather involves opening up the possibility of a 
range of approaches. The range of possibilities is structured according to the conventions 
adopted by different schools of thought in economics (Dow 2004).  
 The strong implication of methodological pluralism is that economists should 
stand ready to justify whatever approach they take. Where new thinking is constrained to 
fall within the mainstream approach, the implicit assumption is being made that 
economics is defined by that approach and thus it requires no justification. It is normal 
for non-mainstream economists to justify their approach in relation to their understanding 
of the subject matter and in relation to an alternative approach – normally mainstream 
economics – ie they are naturally pluralist to some degree. But it would be a major step 
forward were mainstream economists to attempt to justify their deductivist formalism, 
and in particular the exclusivity of this methodological position, in relation to the subject 
matter and in relation to some non-mainstream alternative(s). In particular this would 
require mainstream economists to address the implication of their methodology that the 
economy is a closed system (Lawson 2009). 
 In order to explain the nature and implications of different possible approaches, 
we will focus here on two aspects of the financial crisis which require a policy response 
but which pose particular challenges for theory: 
 
a.  The scope for changes in market sentiment to drive asset prices. While the 
long boom in asset markets had been taken to reflect rising ‘true’ value, this 
assumption was increasingly questioned as the weak basis for risk assessment 
in particular markets came under scrutiny. At the worst points in the crisis 
markets found it extremely difficult to assign values and banks chose as liquid 
a stance as possible, to the extent that the interbank market actually froze. On 
reflection, market sentiment was seen to have driven asset prices up and then 
drove them down. How can swings in market sentiment be explained 
theoretically and what is the policy scope for taming these swings? 
 
b. The central importance of trust between the state, the banks and the public. 
The banking crisis emerged as banks lost trust and then depositors lost trust, in 
particular in banks (and implicitly in the central banks’ support of these 
institutions), while central banks lost trust in banks’ willingness to behave 
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prudently. The payments system, and thus the social fabric, were threatened. 
An important challenge therefore is to restore that trust. What theoretical 
approach can inform such policy? 
  
We will consider different methodological approaches to considering each of these issues 
and the very different policy prescriptions which follow. In both cases we compare the 
mainstream approach with that of non-mainstream schools of thought. We compare it 
mainly to the (Post) Keynesian approach in the case of market sentiment and mainly to 
the institutionalist approach in the case of trust and moral hazard. 
 
The Role of Market Sentiment 
Greenspan (Financial Times, 27 March 2009) expresses the theoretical challenge posed 
by market sentiment as follows: ‘We can model the euphoria and the fear stage of the 
business cycle. Their parameters are quite different. We have never successfully 
modelled the transition from euphoria to fear.’ The crisis was the outcome of ever-
increasing leveraging on the part of all sectors on the basis of confident expectations of 
continuing rises in asset prices, what Greenspan here refers to as ‘euphoria’, and of 
continuing financial stability. When these expectations were not met for some assets, 
asset sales and defaults (due to high leveraging) added fuel to the reversal in asset prices 
and to the increasing reluctance of banks to supply liquidity. This was exacerbated by the 
banks themselves now holding and trading in assets whose prices were reversing. Market 
sentiment changed from euphoria to fear. Before considering how this transition might be 
modelled, we need to consider how it may be conceptualised first, then theorised and 
then, possibly, modelled. Forecasting turning-points is widely regarded as a major 
challenge, but for many outside the mainstream the goal of formally modelling market 
sentiment is itself misplaced in any case.  
 The terms Greenspan used are psychological, and behavioural finance has done 
much to introduce conceptualisations from psychology into the analysis of financial 
markets. But, because the stated aim, or at least the outcome, has been to incorporate 
psychology into the existing formal mainstream framework of rational choice theory (see 
eg Kahneman 2003; DellaVigna 2008), the conceptualisation has necessarily been 
constrained in a particular way, either as cognitive limitations or as unconventional 
preferences (see further Dow 2011). Rationality is defined as the logical pursuit of given 
goals, such that anything which falls outside such behaviour is defined as irrational (and 
to be limited or discouraged by policy). The benchmark is full information, including 
information about objective risk, so there is a concern with cognitive limitations which 
limit the absorption of information and thus estimation of risk, on which rational 
decisions are based. The more activity is dominated by professional players in financial 
markets, with the fullest information and the least distraction by unconventional 
preferences and irrational behaviour, the better the chance of markets not deviating from 
their equilibrium path. 
 But recent experience suggests that market players themselves can find it difficult 
to price assets; indeed this is the normal pattern when markets undergo structural change, 
as evidenced earlier by the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management. To contemplate 
an objective risk measure, which markets are to identify, is to presume that the future is 
knowable, at least stochastically, as presumed by mainstream theory. Unpredicted 
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structural change challenges such a presumption. The more general case is rather some 
degree of fundamental uncertainty, or unquantifiable risk, which looms large particularly 
when current conventions of risk assessment are challenged by events.  
 Keynes (1921, 1937) provided a theory of behaviour under uncertainty to explain, 
not only how we (as agents or as theorists) cope with uncertainty but also how we are 
able to take positive action under uncertainty. He pointed out that it would not be rational 
(in the strict mainstream sense) to make any positive decision to invest under uncertainty. 
While, rationally, we draw on theory and evidence based on past experience as far as 
possible, this cannot be sufficient to guide action with respect to an uncertain future. 
Further, deductive reasoning cannot explain why a set of expectations could change from 
Greenspan’s euphoria to his fear. We make up the gap left by uncertainty by drawing on 
conventional judgements (Davis 1994) and by exercising (or not) animal spirits (Dow and 
Dow 2011). Neither of the latter is grounded in rational choice theory as defined by 
mainstream economics and indeed would be classified as irrational. 
 But to accept that classification in terms of rationality is to accept the bounds of 
that approach to theory. For Keynes, as for Hume and Smith, and indeed for much of the 
psychology literature, cognition and sentiment are not a mutually-exclusive dual, but 
rather are interdependent (Dow 2011). Thus reason requires a foundation in conventional 
belief (just as the Bourbaki project found that deductive mathematics cannot be 
constructed as a self-sufficient system) and must be combined with the exercise of the 
imagination, along with emotion, to motivate behaviour. Far from being something 
necessarily to be discouraged, some sentiment (or emotion) is necessary for decision 
making.  
 Animal spirits are necessary for firms’ investment decisions, given uncertainty, 
and also for market leaders who trigger changes in market sentiment by making bold 
moves against the market. But for most market players it is (informed) conventional 
judgement which is most important. While individuals are the unit of mainstream 
analysis (with possible, though logistically limited, modification to incorporate other-
regarding behaviour), other approaches understand individual identity in relation to 
society (Davis 2003). Rather than a basically selfish atomistic individual constrained by 
society, Smith (1759) in the Theory of Moral Sentiments analysed individuals whose 
behaviour is in reference to society’s judgements or an imagined impartial spectator who 
judges behaviour. (This does not presume unselfish behaviour, but rather behaviour 
which is aware of the consequences for others, and takes this into account in varying 
degrees.) In the absence of certain knowledge, a successful society therefore evolves in 
such a way as to enable action in spite of uncertainty. Institutions are formed and 
conventions established which provide a stable foundation for decision making (van der 
Lecq 1998). 
 Conventions may be challenged by events – they too evolve – and this is 
particularly the case for conventional judgements. In Keynes’s terms, confidence in the 
conventional low assessment of risk increased as markets followed a relatively stable 
path up to 2007. This psychological state had real consequences in employment, 
production and expenditure. Conventional judgements were part of the reality, in turn 
affecting the reality, and reinforcing themselves reflexively as asset prices continued to 
rise (Soros 2008). Market players framed the reality in terms of mainstream theory, 
which suggested that rational market behaviour was expected to produce the pricing of 
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assets in line with true risk and the best outcome for society (or at least this framing was 
used rhetorically). But conventional risk assessment was thrown into disarray with the 
crisis and it took some time for new, more wary, conventions to become established. 
 Let us now consider the implications of this way of understanding the nature of 
behaviour in financial markets, first for approach to theory and then for policy. As far as 
theoretical approach is concerned, questions arise about the scope for deductive logic 
(which relies on the certain, or certain-equivalent, knowledge as to the truth-value of 
premises). If the nature of the economic system is such that it does not behave in a law-
like way which allows confidence in quantification of risk, then uncertainty is the general 
case. To focus on law-like behaviour and quantifiable risk is therefore to focus on what 
for Post Keynesians is a special case, with uncertain scope as to application. In particular, 
the mainstream approach is to attempt to capture behaviour in a deductive mathematical 
system. This approach has the advantage of clarity and consistency within itself, where 
the aspects of reality under consideration are made commensurate by mathematics, but at 
the cost of limiting what can be considered (Chick and Dow 2001).   
 Much follows from the centrality of the concept of rationality, by its special 
definition, in mainstream economics. Just as economists are seen as rationally 
constructing deductive models of stochastic relationships, so economic agents rationally 
optimise on the basis of risk assessments based on stochastic relationships. But if in fact 
behaviour is based on conventional judgements, eg about risk, which are subject to non-
deterministic (but not stochastic) shifts, then the case is strong for theory to address the 
factors underlying those conventions and shifts in the conventions. Just as Keynes argued 
that, in society, our behaviour is based on knowledge derived in a plurality of ways from 
a plurality of sources (with input from emotions), so also the analyst may usefully draw 
knowledge in a pluralist way. Mathematical models play a part, as a way of expressing 
partial arguments in a clear way. But because uncertainty, conventions and emotions, as 
well as non-deterministic evolution of institutions, cannot be modelled in the 
conventional deductivist way, any argument based on a formal, closed model is 
inevitably partial and requires putting together with other lines of argument and different 
forms of evidence, in order to increase weight of argument (Lawson 2009). It is 
worthwhile to consider that, while Keynes referred to the usefulness of formal models, he 
nevertheless warned about the importance of keeping in mind the closures which models 
require, but which need to be relaxed for application of the model’s conclusions:    
 
[I]n ordinary discourse, where we are not blindly manipulating but know all the 
time what we are doing and what the words mean, we can keep ‘at the back of our 
heads’ the necessary reserves and qualifications and the adjustments which we 
shall have to make later on, in a way in which we cannot keep complicated partial 
differentials ‘at the back’ of several pages of algebra which assume they all 
vanish.       (Keynes 1936, pp 297–8)  
 
 From a mainstream perspective, which effectively defines the subject by what can 
be dealt with by means of deductive (mathematical) logic (see eg Blaug 1999), anything 
else falls outside the discipline. This parallels the conclusion that anything which falls 
outside the particular definition of rationality is irrational and therefore to be avoided. But 
the argument for taking a broader purview of possible methodological approaches 
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(pluralism, as outlined above in the Introduction) is particularly strong for policy makers 
who are required, not just to analyse, but to take positive action. Central bank 
publications have been addressing uncertainty increasingly frequently (see eg Aikman et 
al. 2010 for a recent discussion). While policy-makers need to decide on their own 
overall approach and thus range of methods, there would also be benefit in increased 
awareness of what other approaches can offer. Each approach has its own strengths and 
weaknesses, and unanticipated developments might call for guidance from alternative 
approaches. As Keynes (1921) argued, confidence in judgement is higher the more 
different types of evidence (and reasoning) support that judgement. Further, the Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England (1999) has explicitly referred to the 
pluralism they employ in the sense of a range of methods (see further Downward and 
Mearman 2008).  
 But, while the MPC had access to a range of evidence on market sentiment, based 
on different methods, the potential for crisis was either not picked up or not sufficiently 
highlighted. What was required instead was that market sentiment be taken seriously. 
From the mainstream perspective, market sentiment is either a form of short-cut 
rationality or else something to be ignored or eliminated as irrationality. The only policy 
response on market sentiment has been to make markets more transparent, with fewer 
incentives and constraints distorting market behaviour, to allow markets to be more 
efficient. The Post Keynesian approach is rather to understand market sentiment as the 
normal mechanism for market judgement in the face of uncertainty. Theory used to 
understand developments in financial markets should therefore include analysis of 
decision-making under uncertainty, including any changes in the institutional 
environment which might alter the process of arriving at, and perpetuating, judgements. 
This would suggest input from ‘old’ institutionalist theory (Rutherford 1994; Hodgson 
1999) and ‘old’ behavioural theory (Earl, ed., 1989; Sent 2004) which (unlike the ‘new’ 
versions of this theory) are not constrained to analyse behaviour in terms of rational 
optimisation by atomistic individuals.  
 These other theoretical approaches would aid understanding of market sentiment 
and what causes it to change, but also point to possible policy intervention in order to 
stabilise markets. Conventions may depart from what the authorities regard as reasonable 
(rather than narrowly rational) judgement, and psychological theory can inform the 
analysis (see eg Tuckett 2011). This implies the need for mechanisms for monitoring 
market sentiment and for designing monetary policy (especially communication of 
monetary policy) to moderating market sentiment when it is judged to be lacking a 
grounding in reality. What will be required will depend on particular circumstances since 
market sentiment does not lend itself to universal theorising. But to take the current 
circumstances (in late 2011) as an example, the authorities are trying to calm volatile 
market sentiment by reassurances that fiscal austerity packages will resolve budgetary 
problems, rendering sovereign debt instruments secure (as mainstream theory would 
suggest). While these policies may have been encouraged by markets’ own initial 
framing of a budgetary deficit problem, governments could have attempted to put that 
framing into historical perspective, calming markets and reducing pressure for austerity 
measures. But if the real outcome of austerity measures at a time of weak economic 
conditions amid efforts by the private sector to draw down debt in fact turns out to be low 
growth and worsening budgetary conditions, accepting the markets’ framing will have 
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proved counterproductive. While market sentiment makes up for insufficient evidence 
and understanding, evidence and understanding nevertheless do influence market 
behaviour. If market sentiment is simply one, integral, part of the cognitive process, then 
it is not purely psychological. 
 
 
The Role of Trust 
The Keynesian theory of knowledge under uncertainty outlined above emphasises the 
role of (socially) conventional knowledge. But the functioning of the economy in general, 
and of monetary policy and financial sector reform in particular, require the presence of a 
key social convention: trust. A major challenge posed by the banking crisis has been how 
to address the general breakdown of trust between the central bank, the banks and the 
public.  
 Trust has been the subject of new literature within the mainstream, particularly in 
the form of trust games, where the responses of other parties to incentives are not known 
with certainty (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995). But, as Hughes (2011) shows, 
conceptually trust in this approach either collapses into rational optimising behaviour 
(within these circumstances) or it is irrational (and thus to be discouraged). At best, other-
regarding behaviour can be incorporated by placing the pay-offs to others in each others’ 
utility functions in a calculative way. But this is different from trust. Here again we see 
the choice of approach determining the scope of theory. 
 The Hume/Smith/Keynes approach outlined above takes other-regarding 
behaviour as a starting-point rather than a modification. Indeed according to this 
approach, market economies could not function without social conventions, the most 
important of which is trust. Rather than the calculative trust of the game theory approach, 
this conceptualisation sees trust as an alternative to calculation (where calculation would 
not be possible, given uncertainty). Hughes (2011) argues that trust refers to expectations 
with respect to agency (the actions of identifiable agents or organisations). Confidence 
rather refers to the successful build-up of trust with respect to the structure of 
organisations. But when confidence in structure is challenged, as during the crisis, the 
issue reverts to one of trust, and thus agency. What is at issue now is the agency of 
central bankers, bank CEOs and the borrowing and investing public. 
 Since confidence and trust are built up as a result of extensive periods of 
experience, and this is evidently the case with banking, a historical approach can 
contribute to our understanding. As Chick (1986, 1993, 2008) demonstrates within her 
stages-of-banking-development framework, fractional reserve banking emerged as a 
result of the convention emerging of using bank liabilities for payments, a convention 
which relies on confidence in the banks managing their assets prudently. From a narrow 
rationalistic perspective, fractional reserve banking should not work, since it relies on 
what cannot be strictly rational expectations as to risk of bank collapse. Instead it relies 
on a socio-psychological convention; the more confidence builds up, the less the 
possibility of bank failure is contemplated.  
 Central banking develops as the potential for instability in banking becomes 
recognised as a threat to the maintenance of confidence and thus to the successful 
working of the system. Central banks use banking regulation, and supervision and 
monitoring with respect to this regulation, to promote prudent bank behaviour. In 
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addition, the central bank stands ready to supply liquidity to any bank in trouble through 
the lender-of-last-resort facility. The existence of this facility encourages confidence 
which in turn reduces the need for it to be brought into play. The banks are therefore 
providing a public good in the form of the liquidity of their liabilities, with the support of 
the central bank. 
 But there are tensions between the profit-seeking behaviour of banks and the 
central banks’ need for them to behave prudently. Maintaining a balance between these 
tensions, which might in the past have rested on personal relations between bank 
Governors, was challenged in recent decades by the growth in scale and complexity of 
the banking sector. Banking now included a much wider range of functions than deposit-
taking, direct lending and safe investments. Banks had been given more latitude to pursue 
profits in the 1980s with deregulation. But restrictive reregulation in the form of capital 
adequacy requirements had the unintended consequence of encouraging banks to seek 
profits off balance-sheet by securitisation and by activities in derivatives markets which 
were important ingredients in the build-up to the crisis. While banks continued to supply 
the bulk of society’s means of payment, with the lender-of-last-resort facility still in 
place, they were exposing themselves to increasing degrees of risk. With growing 
awareness of that risk (and the weakness of knowledge as to the extent of risk) trust 
between banks, as expressed by inter-bank lending, broke down and so the confidence in 
the market’s capacity to supply liquidity broke down. The public’s confidence in some 
banks broke down (amid general uncertainty about deposit insurance protection) leading 
to bank runs which led to a contagious lack of confidence in banks more widely. Both 
banks and the public in the initial crucial stages were unsure as to whether the central 
bank would use the lender-of-last-resort facility, further damaging confidence. Unlike the 
systemic risk which arises from interconnectedness of highly-leveraged portfolios, the 
systemic risk here refers to the loss of confidence in one bank spreading to others 
exposed to similar forces, something which does not lend itself to capture by deductive 
reasoning. 
 The mainstream approach to theory suggests that the resulting policy issue be 
addressed in terms of moral hazard: the unintended effect of insurance as encouraging the 
taking on of increased risk (where there is some limit on the scope for monitoring that 
risk) (see further Dow 2012, b). In spite of the term ‘moral’, the issue is one of rational 
optimising behaviour, under asymmetric information. Because such behaviour is not 
other-regarding, it is opportunism. It may be regarded implicitly as immoral because, by 
impeding markets from finding the social optimum, the outcome is a reduction in social 
welfare; but because this outcome is an unintended consequence, it may not be regarded 
as immoral. In any case, morality is equated with rationality in this approach; the 
impartial spectator, which Smith discussed as a mechanism for promoting moral 
standards, is discussed by behavioural economists as a mechanism for ensuring rational 
choice (see Ashraf, Camerer and Loewenstein 2005).  
 The policy implications of this theoretical approach are, first, that opportunities 
for moral hazard be limited by regulation, hence the proposal to limit banks to their 
traditional functions to limit the scope for opportunistic behaviour. Second, in the spirit 
of calculative rational behaviour, financial incentives (bonuses etc) would be regulated in 
such a way as to incentivise more prudent behaviour on the part of bank management and 
employees. Third, the scope for irrational behaviour among borrowers from banks would 
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be promoted by ‘nudging’, as a substitute for the impartial spectator (Thaler and Sunstein 
2009). Trust between central banks, the banks and the public would be restored, ie it 
would be seen to serve calculative self-interest to trust. 
 But if we go back to the more general theory of knowledge under uncertainty, 
where social conventions, including trust, are essential building blocks for market 
activity, some important elements have been excluded from the mainstream theoretical 
approach. First, alternative approaches suggest that important influences on behaviour are 
non-calculative and thus not amenable to modelling as optimising behaviour. In 
particular, behaviour which observes moral norms with respect to trust, and then the 
breakdown of such behaviour and the breakdown of trust, are difficult to capture fully in 
a deductive framework. Indeed confidence entails quite the opposite of calculation, 
reducing the need even to pay attention to the possibility of bank failure.  
 Theories as to social conventions, and the nature and role of trust, have been 
explored by ‘old’ institutionalist theory, while the role of confidence in the development 
of banking has also, as we have seen, been analysed within the evolutionary approach. 
Finally, since some social conventions involve moral judgement, eg as to standards of 
fairness, it is important for economic theory also to be able to address such 
considerations. Notions of fairness effectively fall outside the realm of rationality in the 
mainstream framework (Akerlof and Shiller 2009). Nevertheless, much of the public 
policy discourse surrounding the crisis has focused on issues of fairness. This is evidence 
of the other-regarding behaviour analysed by Adam Smith. Fairness issues may be raised 
for selfish or unselfish reasons (reflecting concern over one’s own relative position, or 
that of others). The point is that it is an issue for individuals understood as members of 
society. Similarly, in the financial sector, employees may respond to bonuses as relative 
indications of standing, rather than being incentivised by absolute amounts. Since such 
considerations are important to the internal running of organisations, as well as to 
relations of trust between central banks, banks and the public, a theoretical approach is 
needed which can address them, in order to inform policy. Indeed, since corporate culture 
and issues of governance have arisen as sources of problems within financial institutions 
which gave rise to the crisis, a theoretical approach is required which focuses on 
institutions too in terms other than incentives based on (narrow) rational, fully-informed 
calculation. Behaviour within and between organisations, as between individuals, 
involves social empathy and uncertainty. 
 According to this alternative approach, moral hazard involves a wider range of 
issues surrounding the breaking of trust than the mainstream definition. If the banks had 
risked the trust of the central bank (as well as other financial institutions) by their 
opportunistic behaviour, the central bank also risked the trust of the banks by not clearly 
standing by the lender-of-last-resort facility from the start. Where trust is the outcome of 
conventional judgements with respect to long experience, it is not calculative, but 
nevertheless an important element in relations within the economy. Breaking with the 
conventional behaviour which underpins trust bears the serious risk of breaking trust, 
requiring new prolonged experience for trust to be restored. 
 A return to traditional banking is being considered as a response to the moral 
hazard and fiscal problems associated with the lender-of-last-resort facility being 
provided to large banks. Since it is the deposits of retail banks which perform the vast 
bulk of money functions and therefore it is retail banking which requires central bank 
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support, the mainstream proposal to separate retail banking off from investment banking 
is shared by this non-mainstream approach. But it would be important in addition, from 
an evolutionary perspective, for a clear commitment to be made to continuing to make 
the facility available to these narrower banks. In principle, if these traditional banks were 
to fail, deposit insurance would protect depositors. But, given uncertainties over the 
insurance process, exacerbated by differences in national regulation and practices in a 
global banking environment, it is hard to see how confidence would in fact be restored 
without such a commitment. Given uncertainty, particularly in the kind of circumstances 
where a bank might fail, rational calculation would not in fact justify trust. Rather, as the 
evolutionary approach demonstrates, it takes time, reassurance and experience for society 
to restore a (non-calculable) convention of trust.  
 The more general policy implication, that efforts be made to rebuild trust between 
central banks, banks and society at large, is difficult to tie down further as a general 
principle (rather than with respect to particular local circumstances, including 
institutional history). But this does not invalidate it if the goal is not to seek universal 
policy prescriptions. Further this alternative approach requires a change of mindset from 
basing policy on financial incentives and constraints as they affect the individual and the 
individual firm and turning to addressing issues of fairness and wellbeing at a societal 
level.   
 
Conclusion 
The aim here has been to point out that there are different possible approaches to 
economics which can inform policy (not just different theories within one approach). 
Each starts from its own view of the nature of the economy, categorises it accordingly, 
and established criteria for good argument. It has been suggested that a deductivist 
approach dominates mainstream economics and mainstream economic policy (in spite of 
challenges from evidence). But this should not be regarded as the only option. For all its 
attractions, this approach limits coverage of important issues which have arisen with the 
crisis. The starting point of rational optimising individual behaviour limits the scope for 
understanding market sentiment (indeed any sentiment, eg with respect to fairness), and 
how it may change. It also limits the scope for analysing trust, and considering how it 
may be restored. All approaches inevitably are limited by the very nature of theoretical 
abstraction (far less framing). But, just as non-mainstream economists actively justify 
their methodologies, so should mainstream economists. We have attempted here to 
illustrate ways in which two alternative approaches address these limitations. 
 To argue for consideration of different approaches is to argue for methodological 
pluralism. This is not at all to advocate that ‘anything goes’, but rather that reasoned 
judgement be applied to considering which is most useful among the range of 
possibilities within which different sets of economic theory have been developed. (These 
approaches each represent a set of conventions among groups of economists as to how to 
build knowledge.) We have illustrated the meaning and significance of difference of 
approach in terms of policy to address the crisis. For policy-makers, judgement is 
required in considering the applicability of particular, inevitably partial theories (Dow 
2012c). But it is the duty of economists to explain these theories in terms of the 
approaches which have generated them and to justify the approaches as well as the 
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theories. In particular, the onus is on mainstream economists to justify their theories in 
relation to what is being assumed about the nature of the subject matter. 
 Since the mainstream approach prioritises argument expressed in deductive 
mathematics, methodological pluralism also refers to the possibility of different types of 
argument (plurality of method); deductive mathematical reasoning itself precludes a wide 
range of subject matter which can more readily be analysed using a range of other 
methods (possibly alongside partial mathematical models). The issue is whether a 
deductive mathematical model can be sufficient argument in itself, or whether it can only 
yield partial arguments for input with other forms of argument. If the latter is the case, 
then the role of judgement, in choosing strands of argument addressed to a particular 
context, and considering how to put them together, becomes central.  
 As suggested earlier, the best place to start in exercising judgement is an account 
of the reality to be analysed. On this basis, emphasis was placed here on the significance 
of fundamental uncertainty, for agents and for economists, which society addresses by 
developing conventions. But the urge to action requires animal spirits in spite of 
uncertainty. It is to be hoped that the extreme circumstances of the crisis may fire up the 
animal spirits of economists to reconsider and challenge their own conventions in a 
constructive way. 
 
 
 
References 
Aikman, D., Barrett, P., Kapadia, S., King, M., Proudman, J., Taylor, T., de Weymarn, I. 
and Yates, T. 2010, ‘Uncertainty in macroeconomic policy making: art or science?’, 
Paper delivered to The Royal Society Conference on ‘Handling Uncertainty in Science’, 
22 March, London 
 
Akerlof, G. and Shiller, R. 2009, Animal Spirits, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Ashraf, N., Camerer, C. F. and Loewenstein, G. 2005, ‘Adam Smith, Behavioral 
Economist’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(3), 131-45. 
 
Bank of England, 1999, Economic Models at the Bank of England, London: Bank of 
England. 
 
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J. and McCabe, K., 1995, ‘Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History’, 
Journal of Games and Economic Behavior 10, 122-42. 
 
Blaug, M., 1999, ‘The Formalist Revolution or What has Happened to Orthodox 
Economics after World War II’, in R.E. Backhouse and J. Creedy (eds), From Classical 
Economics to the Theory of the Firm: Essays in Honour of D P O’Brien, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
 
Chick, V. 1986/1992, ‘The Evolution of the Banking System and the Theory of Saving, 
Investment and Interest’, Economies et Sociétés, serie Monnaie et Production no. 3, 111-
 13 
26, reprinted in P. Arestis and S.C. Dow (eds), On Money, Method and Keynes, London: 
Macmillan. 
 
Chick, V., 1993, ‘The Evolution of the Banking System and the Theory of Monetary 
Policy’, in S.F, Frowen (ed.), Monetary Theory and Monetary Policy: New Tracks for the 
1990s, London: Macmillan. 
 
Chick, V., 2008, ‘Could the crisis at Northern Rock have been Predicted?: An 
Evolutionary Approach’, Contributions to Political Economy 27, 115-24. 
Chick, V. and Dow, S.C., 2001, ‘Formalism, Logic and Reality: A Keynesian Analysis’, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 25(6), 705-22.  
Davis, J.B., 1994, Keynes’s Philosophical Development, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Davis, J.B., 2003, The Theory of the Individual in Economics: Identity and Value, 
London: Routledge. 
 
Debreu, G., 1991, ‘The Mathematization of Economic Theory’, American Economic 
Review, 81(1), 1-7. 
DellaVigna, S., 2009, ‘Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field’, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 47(2), 315-72. 
 
Dow, A.C. and Dow, S.C., 2011, ‘Animal Spirits Revisited’, Capitalism and Society 6(2) 
article 1, at http://www.bepress.com/cas/vol6/iss2/art1/.  
 
Dow, S.C., 1990, ‘Beyond Dualism’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 14(2), 143-58. 
 
Dow, S.C., 2004, ‘Structured Pluralism’, Journal of Economic Methodology, 11(3), 275-
90. 
Dow, S.C., 2011, ‘Cognition, Market Sentiment and Financial Instability: Psychology in 
a Minsky Framework’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 35(2), 233-50. 
Dow, S.C. 2012a, Foundations for New Economic Thinking: a collection of essays, 
London: Palgrave Macmillan 
Dow, S.C., 2012, b, ‘Economics and Moral Sentiments: The Case of Moral Hazard’, in 
V. Neves and J.C. Caldas (eds), Facts, Values and Objectivity, London: Routledge. 
Dow, S.C., 2012, c, ‘Policy in the Wake of the Banking Crisis: Taking Pluralism 
Seriously’, International Review of Applied Economics, 26(2): 161-75. 
 14 
Downward, P and Mearman, A, 2008, ‘Decision-making at the Bank of England: A 
Critical Appraisal’, Oxford Economic Papers, 60(3), 385-409. 
Earl, P.E. (ed.), 1989, Behavioural Economics, vols 1 and 2, Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Hodgson, G.M., 1999, Evolution and Institutions: On Evolutionary Economics and the 
Evolution of Institutions, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Hughes, P., 2011, Trust: Economic Notions and its Role in Money and Banking, 
unpublished PhD thesis, University of Stirling.    
Kahneman, D., 2003, ‘Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral 
Economics’, American Economic Review, 93(5), 1449-75. 
Keynes, J.M., [1921] 1973, A Treatise on Probability , Collected Writings vol. VIII, 
London: Macmillan, for the Royal Economic Society. 
Keynes, J.M., [1936] 1973, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money , 
Collected Writings vol. VII, London: Macmillan, for the Royal Economic Society. 
Keynes, J.M., [1937] 1973, ‘The General Theory of Employment’, Quartlery Journal of 
Economics 51, reprinted in The General Theory and After: Defence and Development. 
Collected Writings XIV, London: Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society. 
Kreps, D.M., 1990, ‘Corporate Culture and Economic Theory’, in J.E. Alt and K.A. 
Shepsle (eds), Rational Perspectives on Political Science, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Lawson, T., 2009, ‘The Current Economic Crisis: its nature and the course of academic 
economics’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 33(4), 759 - 77. 
 
Rutherford, M. 1994, Institutions in Economics: the Old and the New Institutionalism,  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Sent, E.-M., 2004, ‘Behavioural Economics: How Psychology Made Its (Limited) 
Way Back into Economics’, History of Political Economy, 36(4), 735-60. 
 
Smith, A., [1759] 1976, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, edited by D.D. Raphael and 
A.L. Macfie, Oxford: Clarendon. 
 
Soros, G., 2008, The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crisis of 2008 
and What it Means, London: Perseus Books. 
 
Thaler, R.H. and Sunstein, C.R., 2009, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, 
Wealth, and Happiness, New Haven NJ: Yale University Press.   
 
 15 
Tucket, D., 2011, Minding the Markets: An Emotional Finance View of Financial 
Instability, London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
van der Lecq, F., 1998, Money, Coordination, and Prices, Groningen: Rijksuniversiteit 
Groningen. 
 
Weaver, D. H., 2007, ‘Thoughts on Agenda Setting, Framing, and Priming’, Journal of 
Communication, 57(1), 142-7. 
